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ABSTRACT
The lack of convergence towards liberal democracy in some African countries reflects
neither a permanent state of political aberration, nor necessarily a prolonged
transitional phase through which countries pass once the “right” conditions are met.
Examining the cases of two ruling parties, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the
African National Congress in South Africa, we develop the concept of productive
liminality to explain countries suspended (potentially indefinitely) in a status
“betwixt and between” mass violence, authoritarianism, and democracy. On the one
hand, their societies are in a liminal status wherein a transition to democracy and
socio-economic “revolution” remains forestalled; on the other hand, this liminality is
instrumentalized to justify the party’s extraordinary mandate characterized by: (a) an
idea of an incomplete project of liberation that the party alone is mandated to fulfil
through an authoritarian social contract, and (b) the claim that this unfulfilled
revolution is continuously under threat by a coterie of malevolent forces, which the
party alone is mandated to identify and appropriately sanction.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 25 July 2017; Accepted 20 March 2018
KEYWORDS Democratization; liminality; South Africa; Rwanda; ANC; RPF
For decades, political scientists have debated whether democracy is spreading or reced-
ing on the global stage. On the one hand, a growing number of scholars have argued
that some form of global “democratic recession” is underway, characterized by a com-
bination of corroding democratic norms within established democracies1 and the “resi-
lience” of authoritarian regimes.2 On the other hand, Levitsky and Way have pushed
back against these arguments, drawing on prominent democracy indices to argue
that “claims of a worldwide democratic downturn lack empirical accuracy” and that
overall “the big picture of the last decade… is one of net stability”.3 For them,
gloomy analyses of democratic recession stem from flawed understandings of the
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events of the early 1990s, and the “excessive optimism and voluntarism” that generated
“unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism,
and gloom”.4
Analyses of the African continent have often oscillated between ephemeral bursts of
optimism and pessimism.5 These range from the heady and often teleological predic-
tions of modernization theorists6 and the celebrations of a “third wave” of democratiza-
tion after the Cold War,7 to narratives of pervasive African crises rooted in weak
statehood, underdevelopment, and neopatrimonialism.8 The reality is more mixed.
At present, The Economist’s Democracy Index still classifies no African countries as
“full democracies”,9 while Freedom House argued recently that “democracy faced its
most serious crisis in decades in 2017” with notable “regressions” in even the most con-
solidated democracies.10 According to such institutions, states within Africa demon-
strate varying degrees of digression from the ideal-type of liberal democracy,
occupying a spectrum of classifications from “authoritarian” through to “hybrid
regimes” and “flawed democracies”. This article focuses on that ambiguous space
betwixt and between authoritarianism and democracy. Like regimes in other developing
and emerging economies, many African ruling parties display hybrid forms of govern-
ance. On the one hand, they might (to varying degrees) demonstrate the outer appear-
ance of consolidated democracies, in terms of institutions and the ostensive practice of
procedural norms such as elections. Maintaining this identity is important for sustain-
ing domestic legitimacy as well as international status; the latter providing vital access to
resources and markets.11 On the other hand, these regimes may simultaneously utilize
undemocratic or even authoritarian means of reproducing their political power.12
Indeed, occupying this space between democracy and authoritarianism is not only a
prominent and resilient feature of such regimes; it can also constitute a vital means of
sustaining power. It may therefore be time to move debates beyond the confines of
democratic “transitions”, “consolidation”, “recession”, or “backsliding”. If we loosen
our concern with identifying regime directionality, we reveal the liminality that often
characterizes contemporary politics. Liminality – a concept traditionally employed by
anthropologists and sociologists,13 and rarely used by political scientists – denotes
the manner in which societies or individuals can inhabit a “threshold status”, in
which they appear to be moving from one distinctive phase of their history to
another, yet their transition to a new fixed status is not fully realized. Instead such
states occupy an in-between state, or what Thomassen14 describes as a “world of con-
tingency”, where there is no certainty of either outcomes or the direction being taken.
The first part of our argument is therefore that the lack of convergence towards
liberal democracy and the continued prevalence of hybrid forms of governance reflects
neither a permanent state of political aberration, nor necessarily a prolonged transi-
tional phase through which countries pass once the “right” conditions are met.
Rather, hybridity is part of the governance strategy: the reproduction of power rests
upon a regime’s capacity to draw from a menu of liberal and authoritarian norms
and behaviours to maintain domestic and international legitimacy in the context of
uneven development and slow economic transformation.
In the second, related part of our argument, we develop the concept of productive
liminality, to help explain how the ambiguity and malleability of this liminal space
betwixt and between authoritarianism and democracy can actively and productively
be harnessed by regimes as a means of reproducing power. Specifically, we argue that
this strategy is most recognizable in countries emerging from crises or periods of
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mass violence, governed by dominant political parties who self-define as liberation
movements.
We select two such countries governed by liberation movements to develop this
analysis: South Africa under the African National Congress (ANC) and Rwanda
under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Despite their obvious historical differences,
we select them because they share certain historical commonalities central to the means
by which they reproduce their power, notably:
. The emergence of their countries from recent periods of mass violence and author-
itarianism (genocide, minority rule, civil conflict);
. Their emergence in the 1990s during the intensification of economic globalization
and democratization after the end of the Cold War;
. Their self-identification as liberation movements seeking to “emancipate” their
populations from long-term and structural neo-colonial governance;
. An incomplete project of “revolutionary” political and socio-economic
transformation.
Critically, we are not concerned with identifying a new regime type to which these
parties belong. We are mindful that these countries have very different democratic
indices, with Rwanda widely categorized as “authoritarian” and South Africa as a
“flawed democracy” perceived to be experiencing some form of “crisis” owing to cor-
ruption, and the “corrosive effect of the perpetual incumbency” of the ruling party.15
There are also significant historical differences between the two countries and parties
themselves, and we are not claiming that there is a singular, ineluctable historical tra-
jectory which they follow vis-à-vis democratic consolidation and/or regression.16 Our
argument is processual, not classificatory; we are concerned with how these different
parties draw upon similar strategies for reproducing their power, namely the exploita-
tion of the ambiguous spaces betwixt and between authoritarianism and democracy. We
contend that both political parties deploy what we call productive liminality, a strategy
characterized by three core elements, with varying degrees of intensity and success.
First, these parties discursively construct the idea of an extraordinary mandate necessi-
tated by an “unfinished revolution”, which these parties are alone mandated to deliver.
Such revolutions are said to take time, requiring patience on behalf of the population
and extraordinary forms of governance to manage popular unrest. Unlike the “contin-
gent democrats” of Asian developmental states, these parties operate at the margins of
the global economy making their economic transformations even more challenging and
slow.17 In a sense, the limited successes of these parties’ bold liberation missions justify
their continued control, for it is only once transitions are complete that their “extraordi-
nary mandate” will end.
Second, these regimes proffer what we call authoritarian social contracts in the
interim: their continued rule is underpinned by a degree of consent sustained
through a substantive offer of security and prosperity, albeit one whose terms of
inclusion and exclusion are ultimately defined not in open democratic dialogue, but
by the ruling party. This contract involves forms of elite patronage used extensively
by dominant party regimes to sustain loyalty.18 However, it also involves forms of
mass patronage: where economic transformation is perceived to be slow and expec-
tations high, welfare is required while “the transition” is underway and incomplete.
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Third, those deemed to abrogate the social contract risk a formof what we call political
abjection. Opposition that cannot be co-opted are maligned as threats to the broader
social and political health of the nation and portrayed as actors who harbour ambitions
to return these societies to past instances of mass political violence and neo-colonial
relations. These individuals are said to warrant illiberal state interventions against them.
This form of productive liminality is not unique to the two parties concerned here.
Indeed, what we wish to illuminate through this comparison of two very different
countries is that such strategies can be deployed – again, with varying degrees of inten-
sity and capacity for success – by parties occupying different positions on a spectrum of
democracy, but which nonetheless share a common interest in perpetuating the notion
that their suspended revolutions or social missions justify or necessitate an idiosyncratic
form of hybrid governance. By eschewing a fixation on regime directionality we instead
draw attention to the liminal spaces “betwixt and between” mass violence, authoritar-
ianism, and democracy, and how these spaces are instrumentalized by regimes to help
reproduce political power.
Extraordinary mandates
Liberation-ideology is not a time-bound, finite political resource of political parties that
came to power as “heroic” liberation movements. In the case of Rwanda and South
Africa, both parties have rooted themselves in longer-term structural missions of econ-
omic and social transformation. Both parties actively propagate the notion that a full
and complete transition to democracy is incomplete, yet have paradoxically born the
responsibility for its completion for two decades. In effect, the ambiguity of their
societies’ liminal status can be harnessed to renew the ideological basis of their
mandate. These parties therefore use the notion of an extraordinary mandate to legit-
imate and sustain a demand for political unity behind the liberation movement for a
period well beyond the immediate aftermath of upheaval.19
South Africa
The ANC consistently reaffirms its self-identification as a movement locked into a con-
tinuous revolutionary struggle to transform society, rather than an “ordinary” political
party. A common refrain of the ANC, therefore, is that its “National Democratic Revolu-
tion” (NDR) is conterminouswith the national will, and that the party’s position in society
is primarily characterized as a “vanguard” of all the “motive forces” of society needed to
fulfill it.20 In its official documents the party therefore claims its mandate was “earned
in the crucible of struggle and the battles for social transformation”.21 The most recent
contends “… the ANC currently remains the only primary force capable of driving the
project of social transformation”22 in South Africa, which, it has recently argued, will
take “50 to 100 years to usher in new era of industrialization and development”.23 Mean-
while, its leadership has gone further, repeatedly suggesting that its mandate is decreed by
God, and that the party is destined to rule “until Jesus returns” (News24, 7 May 2016).
Rwanda
Similarly, since its ascent to power in the wake of the 1994 genocide, the RPF’s leader-
ship has positioned itself as the highly competent “liberators” of Rwanda and the only
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movement capable of building a modern state. The liberation it promises Rwandans is
not only a liberation from the violence of the genocide (a message which conferred sub-
stantial international legitimacy), but also a liberation from the “legacy of distrust,
hatred and conflict” left by the Belgian “colonial masters” and which has continued
to shape post-colonial politics ever since.24 President Kagame and other RPF elites
articulate a particular revolutionary discourse that associates their development
vision with “liberation” from aid dependency, which they purport strips Africans of
their dignity.25 Given the country’s pervasive poverty and aid dependence, these
elites note that “liberation” from foreign interference will take time, granting the RPF
an extended timeframe in which to implement its sweeping development agenda.
Like the ANC, it claims to have an extraordinary mandate to fulfill this long-term trans-
formation, a mandate that extends well beyond that of an ordinary political party con-
fined to fixed term limits.
Authoritarian social contracts
A great many scholars have documented the authoritarian traits of both parties, par-
ticularly their control over media freedoms, suppression of dissent, hostility towards
opposition, abuse of state resources, and single-party domination of elections. Less
attention, however, has been paid to the ways these regimes cultivate consent and
manage policy failings and popular demands for change. Indeed, social contracts
have been documented between authoritarian regimes and their populations elsewhere
in the world.26 These contracts draw attention to the ways in which popular compliance
might be consent-based and contingent, rather than simply reflecting the state’s
capacity to guarantee order through political suppression.27 They form an intrinsic
element of more durable dominant party governance argued to be responsive, adapt-
able, and malleable, rather than uncompromising, intransigent, and brittle.28
We argue here, that in the context of their “unfinished”missions of social transform-
ation, an interim form of authoritarian social contract exists between these parties and
their respective populations. These involve an offer of peace and development in
exchange for political acquiescence towards the regime’s long-term project of social
transformation. Specifically, we identify two core pillars of the “offer”:
. First, the offer of “peace” on the terms of social inclusivity defined by the regime,
notably non-racialism under the ANC and Rwandicity in Rwanda;
. Second, the offer of incremental material betterment and social mobility through
liberal economic ideology. While legitimacy might be sustained in part through
the distribution of welfare, these tendencies are not all-pervasive and exist alongside
more ambitious projects of industrialization and poverty alleviation.
While these contracts speak an inclusionary language of political and socioeconomic
transformation, they are nonetheless undergirded by authoritarian political logics
that serve to extend the regime’s power.
South Africa
South Africa’s supposed “miracle transition” from apartheid was celebrated by analysts
around the world at the time. Central to the offer of peace was the establishment of both
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the constitution and also the broad promotion of “non-racialism” and a “non-racist
society” by the ANC.29 The party has consistently emphasized its own centrality in
securing such societal tolerances and freedoms, arguing that the party “weaved into
the DNA of the new South Africa the African humanism of ubuntu and thus laid the
foundation for a nation and society based on solidarity, accountability, tolerance and
caring”.30 Reconciliation is, therefore, the first element of the authoritarian social con-
tract. It is ostensibly a substantive offer of “peace” and “social cohesion” during a vul-
nerable transition period. However, as Caryn Abrahams argues, “the social cohesion
project, being so intimately connected with nation-building, essentially instantiates a
version of nation that is based on and produces a narrative that seeks to solidify the
ANC’s hegemony”.31
Indeed, harnessing the imagery and iconography of the liberation struggle, and
maintaining a monopoly on its reproduction, is central to the ANC’s identity and its
ability to extend an open-ended mandate. Both qualitative and quantitative research
into South African party loyalties consistently identify the ongoing significance of
racial identities in shaping voting behaviour, and in particular the importance of the
ANC’s identity as a racially inclusive liberation movement synonymous with bringing
social peace.32
While the terms of inclusion into this social contract are nominally universal and
enshrined in the constitution, the ANC nonetheless attempts to act as the ultimate
arbiter regarding which expressions of citizenship are politically acceptable while the
country is suspended in its liminal status. As Levitsky and Way have observed, liber-
ation movement identity is important for maintaining the loyalty of party supporters
and political elites because it heightens the “exit costs” for those who might potentially
leave.33 To party supporters, leaving the party holds the prospect of entering the politi-
cal wilderness: assembling new political formations that can rival the historical legiti-
macy and resources of the ANC presents a formidable challenge, while the prospect
of joining opposition parties stigmatized as “counter-revolutionaries” bent on returning
society to minority rule is potentially unappealing.
Like many other regimes, the ANC has also sought to induce party loyalty and
increase the “exit costs” for political dissidents through elite patronage. Patronage
takes three main forms. First, political office within the state and party has become
the gateway to resources and power, and is widely perceived as a reward for political
loyalty.34 Second, the ANC strives, as far as it can, to consolidate its position as a “stra-
tegic centre of power” in the wider economy; a gateway through which both capitalists
and aspiring capitalists must navigate, not least through its control over government
tendering, but also through the manner in which it has sought to regulate opportunities
associated with Black Economic Empowerment initiatives.35 However, one should not
see the above forms of patronage as simply some Faustian pact between political elites
and capital: it is the simultaneous commitment to mass patronage that underpins the
longevity of the regime.
Notwithstanding the dire socioeconomic legacies inherited from apartheid, under
successive ANC governments steady rates of GDP growth have underpinned incremen-
tal improvements to the livelihoods of many South Africans, including their access to
basic services and improvements in the Human Development Index (HDI). The
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes, for example, that there has
been “remarkable progress” since the transition to democracy, not only with regard
6 A. BERESFORD ET AL.
to growth and poverty reduction, but also in terms of reductions in extreme poverty and
increases in educational enrollment.36
As we will elaborate further below, issues of inequality, poverty and unemployment
continue to undermine developmental progress. In response, successive ANC govern-
ments have committed large resources to expanding access to social welfare as a
means of alleviating the suffering of the population. This strategy follows broader
trends in the Global South depicted as a “return of the state” wherein social protections
(in the form of cash payments) have been extended alongside the pursuit of neoliberal
macroeconomic strategies.37 While the welfare system exhibits considerable shortcom-
ings,38 it is nonetheless argued to provide an “exceptional” social safety net when com-
pared to other countries in the Global South.39 These grants and pensions are often
central to wider household livelihood strategies40 and can facilitate entrepreneurial
activity and/or give people the means to find work.41 Although some scholars have dis-
missed this assistance as crude “tokenism”,42 such critiques miss the broader signifi-
cance of such transfers. As James Ferguson notes, they “make it possible for the new
state to provide highly visible and very effective support… a way of ‘delivering’ some-
thing tangible and valuable, even in the absence of jobs”.43
The ANC has also attempted to sustain lasting loyalty from sections of South Africa’s
powerful organized working class in employment. Some scholars argue that a “class
compromise” has emerged in the post-apartheid era in which the trade unions, and
their relatively privileged membership, are now primarily concerned with protecting
their own interests and what is effectively the political and economic status quo. As Nat-
trass and Seekings note, the fact that many unions have now formed investment com-
panies themselves means that large sections of organized labour have benefited from the
“blurred” distinctions between labour, capital and the state, often at the expense of the
wider poor and unemployed.44
While the country remains in a liminal status and social transformation has only
been partially achieved, these forms of elite and mass patronage have been used instru-
mentally to extend the party’s control over social mobility and encourage political
loyalty, raising the “exit costs” to would-be defectors. However, they are also simul-
taneously central to consolidating the ANC’s ideological self-image as the fulcrum of
positive social transformation and black empowerment.
Rwanda
Like South Africa, Rwanda underwent a massive political transition in the early 1990s.
The genocide and war left many existing political parties, journalists, and civil society
actors dead, displaced, or discredited, allowing the RPF to consolidate its tight
control over all sectors of society. Positioning itself as the only legitimate guarantor
of security, the immediate post-genocide transition period allowed the mostly-Tutsi
RPF to legitimize itself as a political alternative for the mostly-Hutu population.
In place of the perceived divisiveness of competitive politics, the RPF offered security
first, followed by a wholesale transformation of the country’s society and economy.
According to the party, this transformation could not be accomplished by relying on
democratic reform, but was rather better managed through an authoritarian perform-
ance-based social contract between government and citizen.45 Underpinning that con-
tract has been the regime’s developmental leadership. In 2000, the RPF unveiled the
Vision 2020 development strategy, which sought to transform Rwanda into a
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middle-income country over 20 years. Shortly thereafter, the regime began an intensive
public consultation process, which culminated in a revised 2003 constitution stating a
strong commitment to development and democratic governance, prohibiting ethnic
politics, and introducing an affirmative action clause for women. These visions root
the party’s legitimacy in long-term structural change. Achieving these promises will
take time and, indeed, a popular referendum led to a constitutional change that
allowed President Kagame to run for (and win) a third term in 2017. Thus the transition
period continues indefinitely, and the RPF cultivates this suspended transition period as
a means of reproducing its power.
Because urban-based, Anglophone Tutsis – many of whom grew up in exile – com-
prise the majority of RPF leadership,46 the party has worked to convince Rwandans that
it is liberating the entire population from ethnic violence and economic dependence. To
do so, it promotes the concept of Rwandanicity – the idea that “we are all Rwandans”.47
At a 2015 speech commemorating the 21st Liberation Day, Kagame reminded everyone,
“Liberation is not for one person, or one particular group, it’s for everybody therefore
the fruits of liberation should benefit everyone equally”.48 Of course, after decades of
ethnically-defined political violence, Rwandanicity has required heavy policing; since
2003, any public discussion of ethnicity has technically been outlawed on the basis
that it promotes “divisionism”. The government justifies its tight control over public
discourse by referencing the important role of the media in mobilizing ethnic violence
during the genocide.
In lieu of ethnic explanations of power and wealth, the RPF has instead promoted the
virtues of hard work, self-reliance, entrepreneurship, and good performance.49 This dis-
course is extremely important for the RPF as the existential survival of Tutsis depends
on the de-politicization of ethnic labels. Good performance is integrated into govern-
ance structures with officials required to take part in imihigo (the signing of perform-
ance contracts), to submit to audits of job performance, and to take part in televised
public ceremonies in which officials are rewarded or chastised for their performance.50
The government has rolled out a number of informal and formal education projects to
“sensitize” the population to such values as part of the broader “unity and reconcilia-
tion” project.51 These values are integrated into the work of gacaca courts, umuganda
(mandatory community work), itorero and ingando (re-education camps), and during
national genocide commemoration ceremonies.52
Gacaca courts, in particular, were set up across the country as a form of transitional
justice and became a central element of the RPF’s project of consolidating an official
genocide narrative and binding the Hutu population to a new social contract. These
trials involved an implicit compromise where state assistance and support were
offered to Hutus prepared to incriminate their collective identity and/or denounce
family and friends for acts of genocide.53 As Chakravarty notes, this compromise
reflected “an informal elite-mass social contract that consolidated the new order by
tying the new elites to their societal constituents, and demonstrating the benefits of
cooperating with and advancing within the system”.54 This bargain was difficult to
ignore as the RPF had entrenched itself as the central focal point of resource allocation
in post-genocide Rwanda.
Like South Africa, Rwanda has also built an impressive social protection system since
1994. While GDP growth has hovered around 8% over the past decade and poverty
rates have ostensibly decreased, the majority of Rwandans remain financially insecure,
land poor, and unable to find non-farm employment.55 Thus, many rural Rwandans
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occupy a protracted position in that they have bought into the regime’s emphasis on
hard work, yet cannot quite move above the poverty line. In order to diminish feelings
of exclusion among the rural majority, the RPF has prioritized social welfare. The 2011
National Social Protection Strategy outlines a series of programmes that provide cash
transfers to the poorest sections of the population. The largest, the Vision 2020 Umur-
enge Program, now reaches over 200,000 households.56 The government introduced
these programmes to provide a safety-net to the most vulnerable after a 2005/6
survey found poverty was not falling rapidly enough to meet Vision 2020 targets.
Social spending also allows the RPF to entrench a positive and impartial image
within the population and cultivate a sense of the country’s extraordinary circum-
stances, which require a prolonged period of social development.
Thus, despite its authoritarianism, the RPF has succeeded in shaping public percep-
tions of its extraordinary mandate. It is virtually impossible to visit Rwanda without
noticing the enthusiasm for Kagame and the RPF among many citizens. Rwandans
turned out in remarkable numbers to elect Kagame to the presidency in 2003, 2010,
and 2017 (winning 95, 93, and 98% of the vote respectively). In 2015 over 3.7
million people in the country signed a petition in support of a constitutional referen-
dum allowing Kagame to run for a third term. Lawmakers claimed they could find
only ten unsupportive people in the entire country (New York Times, 18 December
2015). Of course, it is difficult to untangle genuine beliefs from manufactured
consent, and the presidential elections and referendum were certainly fraught with
coercion and incumbent advantage – few outside observers would consider them
“free” or “fair”.57 Yet it would be too simple to say that ordinary Rwandans were
forced into voting for Kagame. Instead, many Rwandans have bought into the RPF’s
project of “reimagining” Rwanda and believe Kagame is the best person to lead it.58
Limits to “revolution”
While both South Africa and Rwanda have made substantial progress in terms of GDP
and HDI progress, both societies nonetheless exhibit multidimensional poverty and
intersectional inequalities. South Africa is now the most unequal country in the
world in terms of income inequality. A major contributing factor is the pervasive
levels of unemployment which, according to the expanded definition, means that
almost nine million South Africans are unemployed – equating to a 35.6% rate of unem-
ployment.59 These problems have been compounded by rampant corruption that has
generated debilitating internecine factionalism within the ANC, compromising its
organizational integrity and its capacity to govern effectively.60 This has generated
widespread popular frustrations that have found expression in a diverse and growing
protest culture.
Rwanda has received global acclaim for its success in reducing inequality and
poverty: between the 2011–12 and 2013–14 household living conditions surveys,
Rwanda’s Gini coefficient dropped from 0.49 to 0.45 and its poverty rate fell from
44.9% to 39.1%.61 However, many qualitative studies have raised doubts about the vera-
city of the government’s statistics.62 Today, Rwandans struggle to find wage employ-
ment and secure sufficient land for agriculture. This difficulty is due, in part, to
rapidly increasing population density; as of 2016, there were 483 Rwandans per
square kilometer (up from 321 in 2002).63 While the government of Rwanda has
gone about “re-imagining” the rural landscape through the imposition of crop
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intensification and land consolidation policies, the push for rapid modernization and
professionalization in the agricultural sector risks exasperating and increasing inequal-
ity.64 In urban areas too, the gap between the government’s entrepreneurship pro-
motion discourses and the reality of urban livelihoods puts pressure on the regime’s
ability to manage expectations about the pace of change within the country. Youth,
in particular, are sceptical of their ability to participate in the “New Rwanda” and
often exhibit a fatalism about their futures.65
Given these limits to the revolutionary progress promised by both parties, both must
productively manage discontent by satiating the frustrations of the discontented
through their social welfare programmes discussed above – as well as through the pro-
cesses of political abjection described below.
Political abjection
Paradoxically, these regimes exploit the liminality of their societies, characterized by
their incomplete transitions to democracy and incomplete social and economic trans-
formations, to control expressions of citizenship – and, as a result, the terms of entry
into the sphere of “acceptable” politics. This control involves the bifurcation of
society into “deserving” and politically abject citizenry. Where the poor accept their
lot or channel their frustrations in ways that do not directly oppose the party, they
are not only tolerated but often venerated: they are the noble and hardworking poor
whose poverty is to be collectively mourned but not utilized as a platform for opposi-
tional politics. However, should they politicize their plight in ways that oppose the party
directly, citizens will often experience a form of political abjection. This approach builds
on the work of Kristeva and Tyler who analyse how certain individuals and social
groups are discursively constructed as abject “revolting subjects” who, in one way or
another, represent an existential threat to society’s social and moral health.66
Drawing on Wacquant’s account of how neoliberal statecraft requires the constant fuel-
ling of “social insecurity” through a proliferation of fears about economic insecurity,
terrorism and mass violence,67 Tyler argues that regimes create figures of “national
abjects” who are employed to incite and legitimize “tough” economic measures and
punitive governmental responses, even when these policies frequently curtail the free-
doms of all citizens and further impoverish democracy.68
Here, we develop the concept of political abjection as a sustained political strategy
wherein opponents of these parties are not simply marginalized, but discursively
ejected from the “acceptable” sphere of politics and stigmatized as génocidaires, colonial
stooges, advocates of apartheid, or as ultra-leftists bent on destroying the social foun-
dations of their states. Like nationalist parties in other sub-Saharan African countries
and elsewhere,69 these parties’ continued rule is presented as conterminous with the
nation’s prosperity and security. This situation creates an “us vs. them” dichotomy
where opposition to, or defection from, the liberation movement is characterized as
unpatriotic treachery and/or evidence of collusion with a coterie of dangerous others
intent on returning society to mass violence.70 These parties thus play an extended
role of ideological gatekeeping: striving as best they can to control access to the legiti-
mate political marketplace, mediating which groups can legitimately contend for power
and which are to be considered politically abject. Though to varied degrees and with
differing tactics, these parties discursively legitimate illiberal means to police “excep-
tional” threats.
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South Africa
The ANC has attempted to harness the power of discourses of social cohesion and
non-racialism to establish a form of gatekeeping political power whereby it polices
(as far as it can) the space of “acceptable” political contestation. As Caryn Abrahams
argues, the ANC’s control over definitions of social cohesion and non-racialism
“recreates and entrenches the ANC’s narrative that it is that vanguard for nation”
because when it is made synonymous with nation-building and social protections,
it “establishes the hegemony of the ANC government, and at the same time delegi-
timizes all other pursuits of social cohesion outside this discrete party-political
space”.71
Opposition parties are regularly stigmatized by senior leaders in the ANC-led alli-
ance as harbouring ambitions to bring back apartheid. ANC Secretary General
Gwede Mantashe, for example, has argued that the main opposition party, the
Democratic Alliance (DA) is part of an “anti-majoritarian offensive” aiming to
return South Africa to minority rule (Mail and Guardian, 19 December 2014).
ANC officials have repeatedly argued that the “DNA of the DA is racist” and
affirm that only a vote for the ANC can prevent “the Boers” from returning to
power (Mail and Guardian, 11 November 2013). Such narratives are given credence
by DA leaders who have caused rifts within their party by publicly romanticizing
apartheid politicians and downplaying the negative impacts of colonialism
(AlJazeera, 2 April 2017).
In response to protests and dissent, sections of civil society are singled out and dis-
cursively elevated in their significance – usually well beyond their aspirations or
material potential – as attempting to stir up frustrations and launch a broader offensive
against the democratic state. The party claims that we can witness the emergence of an
“anti-majoritarian offensive” threatening to bring with it “the overthrow of government
and forceful seizure of power” by opposition groups.72 Senior party officials have also
spoken of foreign agendas – most notably the United States – which they argue seek
to bring about “regime change” by mobilizing vulnerable and naive South Africans
against the ANC (ENCA, 11 May 2016).
This strategy has been deployed with protest movements including Abahlali Base-
Mjondolo,73 the Marikana platinum strikers74 and, more recently, the #feesmustfall pro-
tests by students campaigning for free university education. Higher Education Minister
Blade Nzimande, for example, claimed that “There is something sinister behind the
student protests, it is clear there is a third force that has hijacked this campaign”
(News24, 12 October 2016). Echoing such sentiments, Mantashe claimed the protests
were being driven by foreign actors promoting “regime change” (DispatchLive, 4 July
2017), while leaders of the ANC Youth League claimed that foreign “imperialists”
and “White supremacists” were behind this “third force” operation (News24, 24
January 2016).
We should not dismiss such discourses as empty rhetoric for two reasons. First, they
possess a potent nationalist message that helps to consolidate the identity of the party
and one that resonates strongly among voters. A recent poll found that over half of
black South Africans under the age of 34 believed that if elected, it was the DA’s
policy to reinstitute apartheid (Mail & Guardian, 11 November 2013), while polling
data consistently reveals how significant race and racial attitudes remain “defining
factors of the South African political system”.75 Second, the party claims that attacks
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on the ruling party (whether real or not) behoove the ANC to develop authoritarian
tactics “that obviate the impact and attractiveness of these trickeries”.76 They warn,
for example, such threats could generate an “increasing reliance by the state on security
agencies and repression” and that these opposition campaigns and protests “might goad
the state into precipitate action”, citing the shooting of striking workers at the Marikana
platinum mine in 2012 as an “extreme” example.77
An important aim of these discourses is not only to try and discipline society, but to
also maintain discipline and unity within the party itself, including among its wider
allies. Under successive ANC presidents, trade union allies challenging the ANC’s econ-
omic trajectory have been derided as “ultra-leftists” and even “counter-revolutionaries”
who were not only deaf to reason, but also bent on destabilizing South Africa and plot-
ting “regime change”.78 This tactic highlights a limit to these discourses, however: when
they are wielded publicly against internal factions of the party they undermine the
coherency of the party’s identity while also diluting their potency against external
threats.
Rwanda
While the RPF has attempted to bring Rwandans into its sphere of influence through its
liberation discourse, welfare, patronage, and through inclusion in the demarcated pol-
itical forums discussed above, it has also engaged in parallel processes of abjection, in
which people are cast out and cast down from acceptable political life. Forms of abjec-
tion include discursive framings of certain Rwandans as backward or “unmodern”, or
threatening to return the country to violence. They are also material as state security
forces harass, arrest, and even kill those who threaten to destabilize RPF control. All
Rwandans – rich and poor – who do not fully “buy in” to the RPF’s agenda are vulner-
able to ideological and material policing.79 There is no middle ground. Critically, those
who fall out of favour or explicitly critique the RPF’s claim to power are accused of the
ultimate sin: being genocide deniers. The RPF acknowledges that space for dissent is
limited, but insists that consensual politics are necessary in the current context to
prevent a return to violence.
In political speeches, Kagame associates foreign critiques of his actions with coloni-
alism, stating, “It is history repeating itself in a different form. It is a continuation of
slavery, of colonialism, of arrogance, bigotry and telling the Africans, wagging a
finger at them and saying ‘this is where you belong’.”80 Kagame silences domestic
critics by re-directing their critiques back onto them, accusing them of being “bad
Rwandans”, having problems – or worse, being genocide deniers. Bert Ingelaere
describes this technique of discursive policing as a sort of “magic syllogism” whereby
regime officials refute accusations of wrongdoing by saying that the alleged act is
counter to domestic legislation or the regime’s stated policies and goals and thus
could never have merit.81
This discursive policing has deferred many Rwandans’ aspirations for inclusion in
the broader modernity project. Many have come to occupy a liminal status wherein
they remain hopeful they will one day benefit from development, yet have not seen
this progress in their daily lives.82 The results are a weak civil society and collective
silence about the human rights abuses underway. Activists who have publicly drawn
attention to repression have been silenced in harmful ways – threatened, fired from
work, denied work permits, jailed, beaten, and even killed.83 Others targeted include
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journalists, local officials, members of the opposition Green Party, and those working
with foreign non-governmental organizations, researchers, and human rights organiz-
ations.84 Such discursive policing is quickly supplemented by physically violent expul-
sions, creating a group of citizens who are now “enemies of Rwanda”. The RPF executes
its violent “expulsions” for a host of reasons: to “clean up” the country; to remove dis-
senters; to punish non-compliance; and to police what it means to be part of the “New
Rwanda”.
Creating the “New Rwanda” has also required the expulsion of certain Rwandans
from physical spaces in order to “clean up” the country and make it appear more amen-
able to modernity and foreign investment. In Kigali and elsewhere, local officials levy
fines on Rwandans for myriad infractions, including failing to wear proper shoes in
public or “looking dirty”.85 The expulsion of vulnerable populations from the view of
international visitors has been particularly egregious. For example, after plans for the
“New Kigali” were announced in 2007, major development projects in the city’s
centre necessitated the demolition of approximately 70% of all dwellings, most of
which were in poor neighborhoods.86 Residents were resettled in more rural sites,
and security forces rounded-up remaining “undesirable” – such as sex workers, street
children, and the homeless – and detained them or sent them to Iwawa, an island in
Lake Kivu near Democratic Republic of Congo.87 Such “clean ups” have made Kigali
legible to international visitors, which have repeatedly heralded it as the cleanest city
in Africa.
Physical expulsions also take deadly form. Since 1994, journalists, human rights
agencies, and regime defectors have accused the RPF of myriad extrajudicial assassina-
tions inside and outside the country. David Himbara, a former high-ranking party
member who has since defected, noted that since 2012, the RPF’s targets have moved
beyond opposition politicians and journalists to become more random. Recent
targets include everyone from Kagame’s personal physician, who was murdered in
jail, to Gustave Makonene, the country director of Transparency International, to
leading businessman Assinapol Rwigara.88 In 2014, Human Rights Watch documented
dozens of dead bodies that were found floating in a Burundian lake downstream from
Rwanda, while in 2016, it documented the extrajudicial murders of 37 people suspected
of petty crimes.89
These assassinations and extrajudicial murders have not yet led to significant
changes in Western policy towards Rwanda, which continues to receive over one
billion dollars in official development assistance annually.90 Nor have human rights
abuses dented the RPF’s electoral support. The RPF has thus effectively struck a
balance; it is not so authoritarian as to provoke international scorn yet remains author-
itarian enough to secure its hold on power for years to come. The durability of this
liminal status, in the context of slow and uneven growth, therefore depends on the
RPF’s continued success in maintaining popular expectations, bringing people into
its favour and expelling those who pose a threat.
Conclusion
Both the RPF and ANC have struggled to accomplish the political and socioeconomic
transformation of their societies and thus address all of the unreconciled, structural
tensions inherited from the former regimes. Yet paradoxically these parties have
incentives to stress the notion that their societies remain in a liminal status from
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which a “revolutionary” transition remains elusive, and thus which warrant a form of
paternalistic party governance. This notion is central to their claim to an extraordi-
nary mandate to govern through a blend of democratic and authoritarian norms.
On the one hand, their domestic and international legitimacy is premised upon main-
taining a semblance of democracy. On the other hand, their power as political parties
is reproduced not simply through the practice of democratic elections on a “level
playing field”: both parties – to varying degrees – draw upon a “menu of manipu-
lation”91 in their efforts to regenerate their power and legitimacy, including the exten-
sion of an authoritarian social contract and the abjectification of political opponents.
Thus, while citizens of both states ostensibly exercise some degree of de jure rights of
citizenship contained within their constitutions, the de facto democratic space within
which they can exercise them is curtailed, to varying degrees, by the ruling parties’
political predicament.
Hybridity is not necessarily a transitory phenomenon, nor does it reflect a form of
permanent political stasis. Rather, these ruling parties actively utilize the liminal
space betwixt and between authoritarianism and democracy to sustain support in a
context and era in which achieving real economic and social transformation is
slow and challenging. It is therefore important to foreground our discussions of
democratization in African countries not with teleological assumptions of regime
directionality, but rather with the study of regime liminality, hybridity, and ambigu-
ity, within a broader discussion about the slow pace and temporality of contemporary
economic transformations. Such a focus will allow us to better clarify the foundations
upon which party power and legitimacy are currently premised. We contend that
other ruling parties, such as the National Resistance Movement in Uganda or the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front in Ethiopia, utilize some (or
all) of the same strategies associated with productive liminality, albeit with varying
degrees of intensity and capacity for success, as may regimes in other regions of
the world. Premising power in this way of course leaves these regimes vulnerable
to delegitimization: consistently employing the idea that their societies remain
caught between periods of history reflects a holding strategy in the absence of
their capacity to secure long-term popular legitimacy through radical social, econ-
omic and political redress for the past.
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